











Anachronism in Recent Moral Philosophy
Daniel Whistler

In this essay, I examine a distinctive position in moral philosophy that, following Bernard Williams, I label “post-analytic” (2006, 200-1). In one of his final essays, “What Might Philosophy Become?” (2006), Williams sets out a programme for extending moral philosophy beyond its traditional “limits”, such that it will be transformed into an embodied, historical and political form of reflective practice.​[1]​ This programmatic intent has been shared by a number of moral philosophers before and since, some of whom are expressly influenced by Williams’ late work. In what follows, I limit myself to a discussion of just two: Raimond Gaita and Christopher Hamilton, contemporary moral philosophers who, as we shall see, are wedded to the post-analytic position and articulate it through recourse to particularly rich rhetorical practices.
The aims of this essay are threefold. First, I outline the distinguishing characteristics of the post-analytic position in recent moral philosophy​[2]​, particularly its emphasis on the inseparability of form and content. In consequence, a fruitful method for analysing this kind of philosophising is an approach that takes form seriously (a “form-first” method), in which rhetorical analysis functions as a means of accessing substantive philosophical issues. In particular, I focus on the deployment of “untimely terms”. Untimely terms express moral concepts but with an anachronistic resonance that jars with the expectations of an academic reader. My contention is that they do serious philosophical work and, in the first half of the essay, I therefore attempt to specify what that work is in reference to a particular rhetorical case study, the word “soul” as it appears in Gaita and Hamilton’s writings.​[3]​ In the second half of the essay, I then consider Gaita and Hamilton’s more general dispute over philosophical form and attempt to adjudicate on the on-going criticisms of Gaita’s deployment of untimely terms. Taking issue with Hamilton’s “Raimond Gaita on Saints, Love and Human Preciousness”, I suggest that what is often ignored is Gaita’s linguistic idealism—that is, the criterion for the good use of moral language is, according to Gaita, intra-linguistic.
Thirdly, the ultimate stakes of my argument as a whole concern the notions of rigour, clarity and cogency used to assess moral theory. At issue for the post-analytic position is the possibility of other ways of thinking ethically than the analytic tradition has customarily provided—yet, always, retaining the demand for rigour, clarity and cogency. In other words, a critical question for adherents to the post-analytic position runs: are there other forms of rigour, other forms of clarity and other forms of cogency than those of traditional analytic philosophy? As Mulhall puts it,

The point here is not to deny that more familiar forms of critical reflection, of the kind associated with philosophy in general and analytical philosophy in particular, and which tend to focus on questions of inferential validity in the context of assertion and argument, are real and important elements in the human rational armoury. It is simply to point out that there are other forms of critical reflection as well–ones with which we are perhaps more familiar in extraphilosophical contexts, but which are no less concerned to deepen our understanding and enrich our thought by embodying certain kinds of affective response to things, and inviting us to share those responses, as well as to critically evaluate them. (2009, 9)





A spectre haunts moral philosophy—the spectre of anti-theory. For example, both Petitt and Slote in their seminal contributions to Three Methods of Ethics shudder at its apparition. Petitt invokes Gaita, among others, as a moral philosopher who celebrates the fact that “there is no prospect of ever specifying, or even outlining the shape of, a criterion of rightness.” (1997, 115-6) Slote provides a different list (Williams, Baier [1997, 179]), but the structure of the two discussions is identical: anti-theory is invoked only to be quickly brushed aside before the “serious” work of moral philosophy can begin. And this is because it fails to meet minimal conditions for proper philosophical theorising. Slote’s dismissal is illustrative:

We need theory in ethics and thus . . . theoretical virtues like sympathy and unifying power have some weight in deciding what kind of ethical view to adopt . . . I think the real issue in this volume and in ethics generally is what kind of ethical theory to adopt, not whether we need theory in ethics. (1997, 180)

Slote goes on to point to theory’s role in deciding between competing intuitions as particularly crucial: “To decide that issue, we need to look for a way of understanding ethics that allows us to avoid incoherence or paradox . . . We do need some sort of theory in ethics.” (1997 182-3) Anti-theory does not do the job we need it to, because it does not obey the theoretical rules that the majority of ethicists presuppose (e.g. a certain type of coherence, the avoidance of paradox, etc.); it is therefore useless. However, such an argument moves too quickly, for the idea that Gaita and Williams (to take the two most pertinent examples) reject all theory depends on a prior definition of “theory”. If theory is delimited to a propositional specification of a criterion of rightness, then it is true that they might best be described as anti-theorists, but there seems little reason to make this move. Far more plausible (and far more in tune with Williams and Gaita’s own understandings of their projects) would be to speak here of non-standard or eccentric moral theory. Slote’s remarks exemplify a confusion between theory and one specific model for theoretical discourse (between, in Williams’ terms, rationality and a rationalistic conception of rationality [1985, 18]). Williams and Gaita, that is, do not so much abjure theory per se as customary ways of theorising. In this sense, therefore, Gaita and Williams are both fully engaged in Slote’s orienting question (the “real issue” for ethics): what kind of ethical theory should be adopted?




A helpful point of entry into my argument is provided by three characteristic concerns of the post-analytic position in moral philosophy (at least as it has recently been formulated).

(a) Reflection: The term “post-analytic” is taken from Williams’ late work, where he proposes a philosophical ideal of reflection defined uncontroversially as a “general attempt to make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities, in the situation in which we find ourselves.” (2006, 182) This definition is then developed such that reflective philosophy becomes a social, historical, political and embodied mode of encountering reality thoughtfully. Williams frames the concept further as a response to those styles of philosophy that elicit the guiding question: “Of much philosophy purportedly about ethical or political subjects (and other kinds as well) one may reasonably ask: what if someone speaking to me actually sounded like that?” (206) Williams’ reflective practice is thus a way, in Gaita’s words, of “tak[ing] seriously the fact that our thought is inescapably in medias res, in the thick of things.” (2000, 13) Reflection attends to the ambiguities of lived experience, discarding the clear-cut structures of logic; Nussbaum’s appropriation of the Jamesian maxim “finely aware and richly responsible” is apt (1992, 134-5). Again, Gaita writes in this vein of a philosophy that leads us towards reality (2000, 164, 173); a philosophy fascinated by “the contingencies that have nourished particular cultures, particular forms of living and particular natural languages.” (285)
	This results, evidently, in a particularly critical perspective on much recent moral philosophy, especially in the analytic tradition. This philosophy is accused of shielding itself from the ambiguities of moral life as it is lived, in favour of a conceptually-reductive alternative. Such apparent reductivism is said to limit the range and subtlety of ethics and provokes polemics such as the following from the opening to Hamilton’s Living Philosophy:

When philosophers discuss morality they tend to focus on a very limited range of moral notions. They talk a great deal about rights, duties and rules, and about virtues and vices, but there is precious little, if any, discussion in the mainstream of the subject of a person’s spirit and sensibility, of fate, of the nature of wholly conflicting moral world-views, of the mystery of birth and death, of the vanity of life, of a form of wisdom which is not mere practical astuteness, of the meaning of life, and of a whole host of other concepts, ideas and notions. (2001, 11)

A philosophy that “leads us towards reality”, on the other hand, will engage with precisely these eccentric topics.​[5]​

(b) Extraordinary Language Philosophy: Second, like ordinary language philosophy, the post-analytic position in moral philosophy is concerned with the complexity of terms like “goodness” as they are actually used in real life. Everyday linguistic practice provides the initial datum from which it begins and also the touchstone against which its conclusions are tested. Gaita and Hamilton, for example, often speak of their work as elucidating the grammar of a moral concept or mapping its use.​[6]​ But the post-analytic position is also critical of ordinary language philosophy for not going far enough to explore more creative and imaginative uses of language. Again, Williams’ criticisms are influential: ordinary language philosophy rests content with “the language of a life rendered ordinary by the subtraction of the imagination” (2006, 208). The post-analytic position, on the other hand, revels in the rhetorical twists and turns of natural languages, in “particular natural language[s], historically rich and dense, shaped by and shaping the life of a people.” (Gaita 2000, xxix-xxx)
	It is for such reasons that there is a turn to literature, the arts in general and also religious discourse among adherents to this position. Such imaginative language is a source for renewed articulations of moral reality: one thinks especially of Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge (1992) in this regard, although Mulhall’s The Wounded Animal (2009) is also exemplary.​[7]​

(c) Ascetic Realism: A third aspect of the post-analytic position emerges out of a tradition of moral reflection running through Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch that can be dubbed “ascetic realism”.​[8]​ This denotes, on the one hand, the meta-ethical non-naturalist realism subscribed to: normative properties exist out in the world and it is the duty of the human subject to come to know them as accurately as possible. On the other hand, this label also indicates the difficulty of attaining such accurate vision, and so the forms of life—often drawn from ascetic and saintly praxis—required to achieve this end. Moral reality is not given to us; hence, the subject must engage in “the endless task” of moral effort to get at it (Murdoch 1991, 23). Key here is the concept of attention: “a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality . . . the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent.” (1991, 34) When one’s vision is disciplined by both “moral imagination and moral effort” (1991, 37), then one is able to dispel illusion and distortion for the sake of clearly seeing things as they are. Attention is “obedience to reality” (1991, 42), and it is what is required to overcome abstractions in the name of real values. Again, Gaita’s talk of a moral theory that leads us towards reality is apt.​[9]​
“Lucidity” is the most common name for the ideal towards which such ascetic realism strives. Philosophy must become lucid about moral reality, and such lucidity is never given but always achieved through a struggle against delusion, a struggle in which philosophers must employ any means at their disposal, rhetorical or otherwise.​[10]​ In consequence, much stress is laid on the snares and obstacles to the achievement of lucidity. Hamilton speaks of the philosopher “giving in to the temptation to indulge himself in fantasy which cuts him off from reality and from a lucid assessment of his and others” situations” (1998, 320). For Gaita, these are “egocentric corruptions.” (2004, 52) The post-analytic position in moral philosophy involves a constant struggle against delusion in the name of lucidity: it “ris[es] to the requirement to be lucid about one’s inner life [as] an effort to be objective” (Gaita 2000, 256).​[11]​


2.	Hamilton: In Search of Who-ness
Christopher Hamilton is the most radical of recent adherents to the post-analytic position. Not only has he criticised many others for failing to “completely shake off the most fundamental aspect of the approach they criticise,”​[12]​ he proudly displays his scepticism of all mainstream analytic moral thought.​[13]​
	At the centre of his project stands a distinction drawn from Arendt’s The Human Condition:

The manifestation of who the speaker and doer unexchangeably is, though it is plainly visible, retains a certain intangibility that confounds all effort toward unequivocal verbal expression. The moment we want to say who somebody is our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or a “character” . . . with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes us.​[14]​

Hamilton goes on to gloss this passage thus,

Part of what Arendt is saying is that no description can properly capture the “who” of a person. Yet it does not follow from this that some descriptions are not better than others. For there are some descriptions which, even if they fail to tell us of the “who”, at least do a better job than, in my view, the standard philosophical vocabulary does. Such ways are usually to be found in poetry and literature. (2001, 12)

Present here is the typical post-analytic critique of “standard philosophical vocabulary” and the appeal to alternative uses of language, especially those in the arts, to ameliorate it. However, the extent of Hamilton’s scepticism is evident from his suspicion (in line with Arendt) that no form of language is ultimately adequate to articulate the who-ness of the self. As I will go on to argue, Hamilton’s philosophy shares methods and concerns with apophatic traditions in theology. And yet it must be remembered throughout my exposition that a gulf does nevertheless separate them: Hamilton’s rhetorical strategies are never deployed in the name of what is hidden and transcendent (as in negative theology), but for the purpose of alluding to the “plainly visible” self (in Arendt’s words). Hamilton finds that language falters in its description of what is most evident and obvious to moral attention. His is an apophatics of the visible—which ultimately becomes an apophatics of the everyday, describing (or failing to describe) the most mundane ethical practices, those which are closest to us.




Hamilton’s “Philosophy, Morality and the Self: Against Thinness” resumes his attempt to describe what is indescribable but also most visible. The essay is cast as a commentary on Virginia Wolff’s maxim, “All is obscure that takes place in the mind,”​[16]​ and this maxim is interpreted in terms of philosophy’s inability to grasp the subtleties of the moral self:

Our inner life is made up of innumerable cross-currents and undertows . . . Our inner life is in a state of continual flux, adjustment, readjustment, enquiry, attraction, revulsion, curiosity, concern, solicitude, defiance, acceptance and so on to that we find about us. Most, if not all, of that escapes the vocabulary and conceptual repertoire of moral philosophy when it explores the inner life. (2011, 185)

Hamilton’s position is quasi-paradoxical. He is philosophising about something philosophy cannot normally articulate: so, on the one hand, he is clear that “very little [of the self] could be captured in the type of vocabulary and style typical of moral philosophy” (2011, 185), but, on the other hand, Hamilton himself (as a moral philosopher) does seem able to capture these “cross-currents and undertows”. Of course, this is not a genuine paradox, for the implication is that Hamilton’s own unorthodox ways of communicating are (to some extent) able to get at what orthodox philosophy cannot. Crucial are the concrete means by which Hamilton tries to mutate philosophical discourse, so that it is able to articulate the moral self somewhat. Take, for example, the following quotation:

There is [in Sebald’s The Emigrants] an immensely subtle, almost wholly elusive movement of the soul, an incredible moment of stillness suffused with agitation, rebellion permeated by acceptance, anger contained within resignation. (2011, 185)

There are three aspects to Hamilton’s rhetorical practice that are especially noteworthy here: the proliferation of synonyms, contradiction and that untimely term, “soul”.
	First, a striking characteristic of Hamilton’s prose is the proliferation of clauses in each sentence. He does not merely assert a proposition once, he continually returns to it in a different vocabulary.​[17]​ For example, in the same passage Hamilton claims that the self “is made of innumerable cross-currents and undertows”, that it is “in a state of continual flux” and that it is “an immensely subtle, almost elusive movement”. Such statements are not identical, but they do all point to a similar truth—each time with a new nuance which contributes a further insight. The cumulative nature of these lists is particularly clear when they are single words: “Our inner life is in a state of continual flux, adjustment, readjustment, enquiry, attraction, revulsion, curiosity, concern, solicitude, defiance, acceptance and so on.” (185)​[18]​ The thick/thin opposition invoked in the title of Hamilton’s essay is relevant: whereas a thin conception finds a single abstract term adequate to express one aspect of morality (goodness or justice), a thick conception (like Hamilton’s) does not rest so content. Instead, Hamilton’s thick mode of philosophising restlessly returns to his idea of the self, supplementing it with new predicates. Each term in the list thickens Hamilton’s idea of the self. As we shall see, this textual practice of repetition and return is also central to Gaita’s rhetorical strategy.
	The second element of Hamilton’s rhetoric evident from the foregoing is his use of contradiction: “stillness suffused with agitation, rebellion permeated by acceptance, anger contained within resignation”. Each word is cancelled out by the next. For a literal-minded reader, this verges on nonsense, which is precisely Hamilton’s point. The rhetorical device is incorporated to force the reader to give up her normal habits of philosophical reading and engage with the moral self afresh. There is a theological parallel with the apophatic tradition at play here: just as in apophatic texts, Hamilton both affirms and denies the stillness of the self; both affirms and denies its agitation. And just as in apophatic texts, this is done for the sake of something beyond the capacity of language; hence Hamilton’s emphasis on the “elusive” nature of the self. 




The third rhetorical device I wish to draw attention to is the word, “soul”. Hamilton continually names the self as soul, but more often than not he does so while insisting on philosophy’s inability to talk about it: “The vocabulary of moral philosophy . . . simply does not have the finegrainedness necessary to capture such movements of the human soul” (2011, 190).​[19]​ Here emerges another paradox: Hamilton, a philosopher, names the self as “soul” at the same time as insisting that the self cannot be named in philosophy. The word “soul” holds a paradoxical position in Hamilton’s philosophy.
	Crucial here is the fact that Hamilton chooses this particular term, rather than any other name for the self. “Soul” is old-fashioned, indelibly associated with theological worldviews; it should not, someone could plausibly claim, be deployed in academic moral philosophy, especially since historically this discipline has struggled so forcefully to gain autonomy from religious ethics. “Soul” is, I contend, an untimely term deployed by Hamilton precisely because of such anachronistic qualities.​[20]​ The question is why. First, Hamilton deploys it because (as out of place and old-fashioned) it defamiliarises the reader, disrupts her habits of reading academic prose. Moreover, there is another reason that bears once again on Hamilton’s tendencies to apophaticism: the self cannot be named but is simultaneously named as soul. “Soul” acts as a name that does not name. I contend that “soul” is a prime candidate for such a procedure, precisely because it is so rare in academic moral philosophy. Its rarity bestows on it an indeterminacy in this context which fits the role of empty placeholder. The very fact that soul is an untimely term means it can take up the position of a name emptied of all content and determination.​[21]​
	In short, Hamilton employs untimely terms, like “soul”, in line with his apophatic outlook. Anachronisms partake of a vagueness which means they can point beyond themselves and beyond language altogether to ineffable parts of the self. This is one more example of the way in which Hamilton’s rhetorical strategies thicken his philosophical discourse: he empties “soul” of determinate content for the sake of paying more adequate attention to an indeterminate moral phenomenon. The self is named in philosophical language only to express the more forcefully philosophical language’s inability to name it.


3.	Gaita: Conversing with the Past
Hamilton’s deployment of “soul” has one precursor in recent moral philosophy: Raimond Gaita.​[22]​ Gaita not only often resorts to the language of the soul like Hamilton, he also attempts to justify his use of it. As we shall see, Gaita’s soul and Hamilton’s soul remain different; yet both philosophers employ this untimely term as one means of fulfilling the post-analytic ambition to attend to moral reality afresh.
	Like other adherents to the post-analytic position in moral philosophy, Gaita is intent on opening out moral philosophy to elements of ethical life to which it is normally blind. In line with Williams’ ideal of reflection, he attends to examples from real-life experience that, he contends, cannot be fitted into conventional philosophical paradigms. The most famous of these examples is the saintly behaviour of a nun Gaita met in a psychiatric hospital.​[23]​ The story of the nun, as well as a cluster of other key examples, recur in almost all of Gaita’s writings—and this practice of repeatedly attending to the same instance will be central to my argument in what follows. The significance of these examples is to be found in the language with which we respond to them. In Gaita’s broadly Wittgensteinian model, it is through attention to the grammar of our responses that philosophical insight emerges. This involves taking seriously words we are uncomfortable with in academic philosophy, despite their prevalence in moral deliberation: words like “preciousness”, “Goodness with a capital g” and “soul”.
	Again like other adherents to the post-analytic position in moral philosophy, Gaita insists that the grammar of this ethical “language game” is irreducible and heterogeneous to other discourses. Different criteria are needed to assess it—criteria sensitive to the particular form of a turn of phrase and attendant to the tone in which it is made. For example, Gaita returns to his example of the nun, “Instinctively, but not at all clearly, when I wrote about the nun, I realised that to say that the nun had revealed [the patients”] inalienable dignity was to speak in the wrong key . . . It would have made her seem like a Kantian heroine.” (2011, 22) To speak of dignity in this context is wrong—not logically of course, but morally: “dignity” strikes the wrong tone on this occasion. In short, ethical discourse resides in “a distinctive cognitive realm” (2004, xxxv) with its own rules and criteria of evaluation. Gaita labels this “the realm of meaning”, an autonomous “conceptual and moral space” (2011, 21) in which terms acquire ethical meaning through processes different from meaning-acquisition in science.
	Key then to Gaita’s project is the specification of these processes by which terms become ethically-charged and enter the realm of meaning. Gaita’s guiding metaphor for all such processes of moral sense-acquisition is conversation: 

I have tried to bring out that [moral] descriptions have to be made living and authoritatively resonant through the integrity of a disciplined but creative engagement with them. I have called that engagement “conversational” . . . They speak to us because they resonate with the authority of past speech. (2004. 123-4)

The moral philosopher must test her own formulations against traditional ways of speaking in light of contemporary demands. It is through this labour that ethical concepts become “objective” or “lucid about one’s inner life” (2004, 123). This, then, is the criterion for testing moral terms—their immersion in the “richness” and “power” of pre-existing natural languages: “Our thoughts must remain within a conceptual space which is conditioned by a natural language, rich in phrases and descriptions.” (2000, 252-3) Or as Gaita puts it elsewhere, “Some aspect of the past speaks to us again and enters a new conversation.” (2004, 124) The consequence is that moral philosophy must attend to how the grammar of one’s responses relates to traditions of natural language. This attentive conversation between present and past is what constitutes the “authority” of moral concepts.
	With this theoretical background in mind, I now return to my case study of the soul. As in Hamilton’s writings, “soul” appears frequently in Gaita’s philosophy. The last chapter of A Common Humanity is entitled, “Truth as a Need of the Soul”. However, Gaita goes further than Hamilton in justifying these deployments of “soul”. He does so by distinguishing between speculative and non-speculative conceptions (2000, 238-9). Gaita’s use of “soul”, that is, does not commit him to the existence of any physical or metaphysical entity, for it takes place in the realm of meaning: its truth is moral, not speculative or scientific. What is more—and here we return to the crux of the essay—Gaita chooses “soul” (along with “preciousness” and a cluster of other key concepts) as a guiding thread through the realm of meaning, because of the success with which it passes the test of disciplined conversation with tradition. This is a self-evident point: “soul” is a term from the past, and it is from this past that it draws its power and so its authority.​[24]​ This is a theory of untimely terms: anachronisms are to be deployed in moral philosophy precisely because their old-fashioned ring facilitates the conversation with tradition that Gaita insists is necessary for moral objectivity. When resuscitated in the present, untimely terms become microcosms of our on-going moral conversation, for in them the struggle towards lucidity is played out.




For Gaita, the struggle towards lucidity thus consists in the transition from indeterminacy to over-determination. Untimely terms, like soul and preciousness, originally appear as indeterminate, before being scrutinised in the realm of meaning. Gaita, that is, attends to the tone in which “soul” is used in moral responses; this tone makes possible the employment of “soul” where synonyms like “psyche” and “self” cannot be employed: 

Why then use the word [“soul”], if it is so likely to be misunderstood in times when the soul is almost universally identified with a non-material substance, the property of religion and spiritualism? Is it not bound to be assimilated to speculation about the existence of an immaterial entity, which might or might not survive the death of the body? A clue to an answer lies in the fact that it is so odd to substitute “psyche” for “soul” in [ethical] expressions . . . In those expressions, “psyche” is not a bad substitute for “soul”. It is no substitute at all. (2000, 239-40) 

“Soul” makes use of a tone which is able to critically distinguish “a deep or rich inner life” from “a shallow inner life” (2004, 117). It does critical work in the realm of meaning in a way that “psyche” or “self” cannot. Hence, from an initial, indeterminate state, “soul” is now on its way to occupying a determinate and central place in the realm of meaning. This process of determination is achieved by means of attending again and again to this word and its place in ethics, and so this is precisely what Gaita does. One can speak of this repetition as a form of thickening: “soul” becomes a thick concept because Gaita persistently scrutinises its place in the realm of meaning. This is what he means by mapping out “my “conceptual geography” of the non-speculative conception of the soul” (2004, 116).
	There is a discipline at work here, the discipline of rigorously attending to one concept alone. This is most evident in Gaita’s continual dissatisfaction with the untimely term, “preciousness”, another anachronism he reincorporates into contemporary moral discourse.​[26]​ After originally using it in Good and Evil, Gaita subsequently finds “preciousness” an embarrassing term, and apologises for its presence in his later works (2000, 5; 2004, xxvi-ii).​[27]​ Such apologising is not extra-philosophical, however; it is an integral part of the performance of the conversation by which the term’s conceptual geography is mapped out. Through this additional tone of embarrassment, “preciousness” is thickened and achieves determinateness in the realm of meaning. In Gaita’s words, the concept “finds its voice” (2000, 256-7) when the reader develops an ear for these nuances (2004, xxvi-xxvii). Variation of tone is one means by which an untimely term becomes morally-charged. Every passage in Gaita’s corpus therefore plays a part in cumulatively constituting the realm of meaning. Each time Gaita attends to a concept afresh he continues the conversation (with himself) by means of which moral objectivity is established. Untimely terms, like soul, are particularly potent—even paradigmatic—instances of this process. 
	To conclude this section, it is worth noting—and this will become increasingly important as the essay continues—the type of considerations involved in the Gaitan conversation over meaning. This is a hermeneutical conversation between different languages and what is at stake is which word (e.g. “soul” or “psyche”) sounds better or has the right tone. Moreover, the criterion for deciding this is an intra-discursive one: can the term take on a moral meaning relevant to contemporary articulations in the light of the history of its use in moral discourse? This is a form of linguistic idealism: at no point need the philosopher refer to events outside of moral discourse past and present. What the untimely term (for example) represents or makes reference to (outside of language) is not relevant to the constitution of sense in the realm of meaning.


4.	Hamilton on Gaita: “A Sentimental Distortion”
Gaita and Hamilton both utilise untimely terms to thicken moral discourse. The case study of “soul” has pinpointed the specific rhetorical methods by which this thickening occurs. It is at this point that Gaita and Hamilton diverge. Hamilton’s apophatic tendencies mean that thickening occurs through showing up the inadequacies of language: “soul” takes on the role of a name which is no name; it is emptied out into a state of indeterminacy. On the contrary, Gaita involves “soul” in a process of gradual (over)determination: he maps out its conceptual geography on the threshold between past and present. Gaita and Hamilton therefore embark on opposite strategies; yet it remains true that in both cases it is the fact that “soul” “sits on the edge of conceptual territory” and academic respectability (Gaita 2004, xvii) which bestows on it its authority in the realm of meaning.
	For Hamilton, however, Gaita’s strategies do not go far enough. In “Raimond Gaita on Saints, Love and Human Preciousness”, Hamilton criticises elements in Gaita’s philosophy that, he claims, fail to live up to the ideal so central to the post-analytic position—lucidity. According to Hamilton, Gaita does not attend to reality sufficiently; he thus ends up a purveyor of sentimentality.
	Hamilton focuses on Gaita’s discourse on saints. The nun that Gaita observed in the psychiatric hospital exhibited saintly behaviour—that is, he claims that her attitude shattered standard ethical frameworks, exemplifying instead “goodness with a capital G”. Of course, Gaita’s appeal to saintliness is another example of his utilisation of productive anachronism: to call the nun a saint is, in the context of academic moral philosophy, an untimely term.​[28]​ For Hamilton, however, it is an unsuccessful untimely term. He observes that it is remarkable, considering how often Gaita returns to the story of the nun and how significant it is for his work as a whole, how little the reader knows about her. Not only are mundane details like her name and age lacking, but also facts that seem morally pertinent: what she specifically did during her time in the psychiatric hospital, what she said about the patients and to them, her motivations and what in her life had brought her to treat them in this “saintly” way. None of this information is supplied by Gaita: there is a “refusal to discuss the psychology and biography of “saints”.” (2008, 186) Similar lacunae are present in Gaita’s allusions to other saintly figures as well. He repeatedly fails to contextualise these stories in the lives of others, providing mere “moments detached from the narratives of their lives.” (187)
	From such observations, Hamilton concludes that Gaita’s moral philosophy (insofar as it rests on such narratives) remains oddly abstract and divorced from lived experience: “Unless and until Gaita tells us something of the details of the psychology of the saints, his reflections have a somewhat unreal or even, I would judge, sentimental quality to them, since he omits discussion of the harsh reality of who and what these people often are.” (2008, 185) In consequence, Gaita’s use of “saint” is disconnected from how the term is ordinarily understood. Hamilton writes, “The notion of sainthood does not seem to have much to do with what one normally supposes a saint to do or be.” (184)​[29]​ By failing to make concrete this appeal to saints, Gaita fails to make sense of the concept for the reader. Hence, on both these points (the abstractness and meaninglessness of his discourse on saints), Gaita falls foul of his own imperative to construct a philosophy that leads towards reality. He fails to attain lucidity, his prose becomes “terribly vague” (187) and it suffers “a sentimental distortion” (188).​[30]​




The purpose of Hamilton’s critique is to pinpoint those characteristics of Gaita’s form of philosophising that remain trapped in analytic philosophy, thereby failing to fulfil the promise of the post-analytic position. In particular, Hamilton is concerned with the way in which Gaita’s philosophical voice gains authority. He accuses Gaita of viewing moral phenomena “monolithically” (2008, 190), and so exhibiting the theoretical vice of a “craving for generality” (191). That is, Hamilton sees in the personal anecdotes at the foundation of Gaita’s ethics a tendency to foreclose the views of others, especially to the extent they may challenge Gaita’s own. Gaita moves from his own perspective to universal conclusions too quickly, thereby bypassing the plurality of different moral voices. He “erases the ‘we’” (192) in oscillating uniformly between “I” and “one”:

The problems in this area partly depend on the weight that Gaita wishes to place on such examples as Mother Theresa, the nun and so on . . . He is bearing witness to certain examples—”encounters”, he says—that have struck him forcibly. He is, he says, speaking personally. But not everyone has had such experiences . . . What one might have expected from Gaita, then, is a deepened sense of the utter contingency of his having had the experiences he has had, a sense that would lead him to place them in a context that would, if not reduce their force, then at least allow them to be placed alongside other experiences that cut in different—not necessarily opposing—directions. But this is not at all what we get. Rather, Gaita presents us with a vision of the moral world whose tone is one of absolute conviction. There is no sense in the manner in which he writes that he might have got it all wrong or even that he has a sense of irony about his claims. (192)

The example of saintly behaviour illustrates this: Gaita alludes to his own personal experience of the nun’s comportment to draw general conclusions for moral philosophy; however, according to Hamilton, he fails to provide sufficient information for the reader to form her own opinion on such comportment, nor does he even give the nun herself a voice. The reader is excluded from Gaita’s moral reasoning.​[32]​
	This matters because Gaita is programmatically committed to the ideals of plurality and inclusiveness (2000, xxix). And indeed a philosophy which puts such high value on lucidly attending to what is really going on, as well as on the model of conversation, surely ought to incorporate a range of moral responses. In contrast, in his own work Hamilton sets out an alternative means of establishing an authoritative moral voice, and unsurprisingly he appeals to the dialogic novel as his model (2001, 8). For Hamilton, it is by eliciting the reader’s dissent that authority is obtained. Rather than excluding the reader from a “monolithic” reasoning process that shifts immediately from “I” to “one”, here the authority of discourse rests on dialogue and disagreement.​[33]​


5.	A Hermeneutics of Lucidity
The overriding aim of this essay has been to formulate ways in which the post-analytic position in moral philosophy can be rationally assessed, thus warding off any hasty identification of it with anti-theory. That is, to employ Gaitan language, I am delineating the rules of the realm of meaning, thereby describing the process by which ethical discourse is made lucid (lucidity being the ideal in this realm). In conclusion, I want to bring this out more explicitly by answering the questions: when are untimely terms lucid? And by what criteria does one make this decision?
	I have shown that the overriding model by which Gaita describes this process is conversation. The lucidity of ethical discourse is tested by means of establishing a conversation between past and present. If the historical baggage that an untimely term connotes helps shed light on moral reality now, it is lucid. In the case of anachronisms, this is a process of giving fresh life to old words.​[34]​ Yet, this is not yet to get to the root of the matter, for one may further ask: how is the reader to recognise this revelation of moral reality through the untimely term? The answer is to be found in the idea of tone so dear to Gaita.​[35]​ The untimely term is lucid if it strikes the right tone for the reader. If “soul” (for example) is read in a tone that animates the reader’s own moral reflections, it is lucid: it reveals something of moral reality within philosophy. If “soul” inhibits such reflections, then the philosopher who uses this term in her work may well be under some form of delusion and so have failed to attend correctly to moral reality.​[36]​ Although this is not the only possibility: the fault may well lie with the reader (as well).​[37]​
Returning to Hamilton’s criticisms of Gaita, we can now clearly see that it is important to specify the type of conversation being undertaken in the realm of meaning. This is not (at least initially) a conversation about what is actually the case, but about what sounds right. To criticise Gaita on a representational basis is to miss the fact that what is at stake is the relation between words (e.g. does “soul” sound more appropriate in moral discourse than “self”? And what about “spirit”?). Hamilton occasionally overlooks this. Take, for example, the following criticism of Gaita:

His claim about building out of a sense of the preciousness of human beings a more tractable structure of rights and justice looks like an historical claim, but, if it is, it is woefully underexplored in Gaita’s work and almost certainly deeply misleading. Indeed, he gives nothing like an argument for it. At the very least, what he says—or, rather, what he fails to say—will have to be supplemented, on the one hand, by some hard reflection on the relation between rights and natural law, a concept which goes back, at least in one form or another, to Sophocles, and, on the other, by an exploration of the growth of the concept of rights out of Roman law. There is a peculiar unreality in Gaita’s claim here. (2008, 191)

Is this really the kind of account which would facilitate Gaita’s demonstration of the lucidity of a language of preciousness? What matters is how (what the reader understands to be) the historical usage of preciousness and rights informs her own moral reasoning, rather than whether such baggage actually corresponds to historical “reality”. It is crucial to note what Gaita does provide instead of such an empirical account: he returns again and again to this term “preciousness”, speaking of it in different registers (all of which mark his unease), thereby gradually determining and thickening its tone. This is the appropriate process for giving language reality in the realm of meaning.
	And yet Hamilton’s criticism may well still hold to the extent that Gaita’s reconstruction of the meaning of “the preciousness of human life” remains too monolithic, neglecting the conflicting ways in which this phrase has been historically deployed. Diverse uses—whether historical or contemporary—must always be part of the conversation. Such a corrective on the hermeneutics of lucidity is significant for two reasons. The first concerns the threat of relativism: if striking the right tone is sufficient to determine moral terms in the realm of meaning, what prevents one moral term from striking different tones for different readers? Of course, initially the answer can only be: nothing. For it is only by means of transformative conversation and hermeneutic discipline, involving a full range of voices, that convergence becomes possible (even if unlikely). If relativism is to be avoided, the thorough-going pursuit of dialogue (as on Hamilton’s model) is a necessary constraint on the Gaitan model of conversation. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that Gaitan hermeneutics should be jettisoned or replaced, but rather supplemented by Hamilton’s appeal to the dialogic novel.
	Second, this Hamiltonian supplement helps ease a tension that has emerged in this essay between the idealism (or subjectivism) of “striking the right tone” as a meta-ethical criterion and the post-analytic commitment to non-natural moral realism. That is, on first blush, value seems both dependent on the reader and independent of her. Again, the answer must appeal to both the labour of conversation and its inclusiveness. “Striking the right tone” is not something immediately given; it requires a long, fraught process of labour in order to be attained (as Gaita’s writings testify), and central to such labour should be dialogue with others. Delusion, irresponsibility and vacuity in the moral sphere are overcome in the name of lucid attention to reality by means of thorough-going conversation inclusive of the full diversity of moral-language use. Again, therefore, Hamilton’s model augments, rather than replaces, Gaita’s.


























^1	 . I elucidate Williams’ idea of reflection more fully below.
^2	 . It will be evident in what follows that many of the positions espoused from this perspective are not themselves new. Indeed, the critique of analytic argument in ethics could be said to go back at least as far as Aristotle’s criticisms of those who “take refuge in argument, thinking they are doing philosophy, and that this is the way to become excellent people.” (2000, 1105b) In this sense, the “post” in post-analytic is not meant strictly chronologically, but to indicate a perennial wish to “go beyond” current modes of philosophising. Moreover, Williams’ account of “the post-analytic” is not the only one, and it should be borne in mind throughout that this term can have very different meanings in other philosophical contexts.
^3	 . To make clear from the beginning: I am not suggesting that “soul” is generally an anachronism in all contexts; however, it does, I am claiming, have an anachronistic resonance within the contemporary moral philosophy of the academy.
^4	 . See further Carter and Whistler 2011. Diamond often makes this need for “anything but argument” particularly clear (1991; 291-318; 367-82).
^5	 . See further the criticisms of “mainstream” philosophy “in the English-speaking world” which litter the opening pages of books that espouse this position; for example, Hamilton 2001, 1 and Cottingham 2005, vii, 2-3. Of course, such criticisms are not the preserve of these thinkers alone (as already noted in footnote 2); a well-established feminist critique (to name but one) can run along very similar lines. Indeed, in terms of its concerns more generally, it would be false to assert that the post-analytic position is particularly original; in fact, my argument is that it is when it comes to the particularities of its rhetorical practices (as motivated by such concerns) that it is to be distinguished.
^6	 . See, for instance, Gaita 2000, 24, 241; 2004, xxiv, 127, 138; Hamilton 2001, 14, 1998 316. Three extremely influential post-Wittgensteinian voices in this context are Cora Diamond, R.F. Holland and Peter Winch.
^7	 . On the question of the legitimacy of the employment of literature in moral philosophy, see the debate in the 1983 issue of New Literary History devoted to the topic, especially Raphael 1983.
^8	 . See further Whistler 2011.
^9	 . This presupposes, moreover, that the meaning or significance of moral phenomena is only disclosed in the proper response to it. Such meaning is not available independently of lucid engagement. Hence, according to Gaita, Aristotle was correct to claim that “the education of feeling and character was an epistemic condition of right judgement on what could only be disclosed in authoritative example.” (2004, 46)
^10	 . “Lucid” is strictly predicated of the philosophical text; however, such textual lucidity provokes a connection with reality in the reader’s mind, so I will also speak of lucid subjects. The concept of lucidity itself is unfortunately underexplored in the literature. As a reviewer of this paper pointed out, a comparison between contemporary uses of lucidity and the concepts of enargia and pro ommaton poiein in Aristotle’s Rhetoric III could prove particularly illuminating.
^11	 . Gaita elsewhere sums up this requirement of lucidity in a way which makes clear why it requires the kind of form-first analysis I am offering in this essay, “The effort to overcome [illusions] is an effort to see things as they are, an effort oriented to truth, but it is an effort in which feeling and thought, form and content are inseparable.” (2011, 14; see also 2000, 252-3). To put it another way, the post-analytic position provides a significant counter-example to Jon Stewart’s recent claims (2013) concerning “conformity” of style in Anglophone philosophy, particularly its general refusal to countenance “the unity of content and form in philosophical writing”.
^12	 . These words are directed at Nussbaum (2001, 6). I consider his extensive critique of Gaita in Section Four.
^13	 . Indeed, unlike Gaita, Williams and others, Hamilton does deliberately position his work as “anti-theoretical”, since life, according to Hamilton, is contradictory and therefore, he infers, theory cannot describe it adequately on pain of contradiction. However, the following may suggest that he gives up on theory too quickly.
^14	 . Arendt 1958, 181; quoted in Hamilton 2011, 5. See further discussions of this passage in Hamilton 1998, 331-2; 2009, 628.
^15	 . Holland 1980, 107; quoted in Hamilton 2001, 64.
^16	 . Wolff 2008, 71; quoted in Hamilton 2011, 185.
^17	 . Compare Hamilton’s tendency to proliferate examples: for instance, in “Ethics and the Spirit” (1998, 323-5) where he concludes a run through Dostoevsky, Carles, Hazlitt and Chekov with the words, “These examples could, of course, be added to.”
^18	 . See also 2001, 12.
^19	 . For further examples of Hamilton’s use of “soul”, see 2001, 157-61.
^20	 . The role of anachronism in contemporary ethics is much greater than it might at first appear. Much dissatisfaction with “modern moral philosophy” results directly in a productive utilisation of anachronism: to return to Aristotle, for example, is precisely to recommend the employment of ancient concepts for the purpose of unsettling present orthodoxies. This, of course, is Anscombe’s point in the opening to “Modern Moral Philosophy”, “Anyone who has read Aristotle’s Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried, or far in the background, in Aristotle.” (1958, 1) Conversely, she deliberately deploys the idea of virtue and the function argument (to give just two examples) as productive anachronisms—concepts that challenge and disrupt the orthodoxies of modern ethics. My concern here is not with such argument through anachronism in general, but a particular instance of it: the use of anachronistic names or untimely terms. Gaita and Hamilton’s employment of “soul” to name the self seems consciously anachronistic in tone; however, there is no explicit argument presented here. Instead, the philosophical work performed by “soul” is not spelt out: it takes place on a rhetorical level. It should also be noted that the reliance on untimely terms to perform philosophical work is not solely limited to moral philosophy. Work in the philosophy of religion (often with a strong ethical dimension) also uses similar devices. John Cottingham’s appeal to “spirituality” (2005) is similarly intended to unsettle the contemporary philosopher of religion by means of its unfashionable resonance.
^21	 . To retain the theological reference for Hamilton’s thinking, he thus engages in a linguistic variant of kenosis.
^22	 . For a further precedent, see Murdoch 1991, 44-5 (for example).
^23	 . The nun’s story is most fully developed in A Common Humanity (2000, Chapter One), but is revisited in numerous later publications.
^24	 . Although it remains problematic throughout Gaita’s work how monolithic and stable such past traditions and meanings are assumed to be, as we shall see.
^25	 . See Hauerwas 2011, Mulhall 2011, Wynn 2009.
^26	 . Elsewhere, Gaita’s uneasiness with the term “vocation” (2005, 48-51) provides one more illustration of this process.
^27	 . Later he returns once more to these apologies, framing them in terms of embarrassment (2011, 3).
^28	 . Hamilton himself flags this up: he contrasts its use in some historical traditions with its absence from “analytic ethics”. (2008, 181).
^29	 . “How is it,” he continues, “that he supposes he can place such emphasis on the figure of the saint if he does not discuss at least a few real saints and something of their life and thought?” (185) None of this is to deny for Hamilton, however, that with the right kind of historical/empirical grounding “saint” can do helpful moral work.
^30	 . On Gaita’s own virulent criticisms of sentimentality, see (for example) 2000, 251; 2004, xxxiii.
^31	 . See also 2011, 4-11. For more general remarks by Gaita on the value of biographical narrative, see 2003.
^32	 . The relation of this monolithic style to analytic ethics is made clear by remarks on the latter in Hamilton’s Living Philosophy: “The philosopher, taking himself to speak in the voice of reason, speaks in a voice which is also the reader’s voice when this has been purged of its personal elements . . . It is the coming together of two minds which have no individuating characteristics and thus are not two minds, after all, but one – the impersonal mind of reason, conversing, as it were, with itself alone . . . Academic philosophy is written as if there is no more work for readers to do once they have understood and absorbed the argument the philosopher offers.” (2001, 4-5)
^33	 . As a reviewer of this paper pointed out, the Bakhtinian resonance to Hamilton’s project would be worthy of further exploration beyond the scope of the present essay.
^34	 . As Hamilton puts it, “Someone who speaks with real style finds new ways of speaking or new ways of giving a tried vocabulary fresh life. Such a person speaks with a kind of vitality and energy which mean that he is fully present in his words.” (2001, 46)
^35	 . The authority of words “for us almost always depends on their tone.” (Gaita 2011, 11) Hamilton’s concept of style does similar work here (see previous footnote). Hamilton does also appeal to tone (1998, 334) and Gaita conversely also appeals to style (2004, 124). Again, Diamond (1991, 291-308) provides a useful theoretical aid for thinking through the right tone as a criterion in moral philosophy.
^36	 . That is, although the untimely term might initially jar with or unsettle the reader’s reflections, at some point the “appropriate” term will begin to sound appropriate. There will always be an ultimate moment of reconciliation, when the tone is right. Here, however, a problem presents itself: can the Gaitan conversation continue once the right tone is attained or does the successful philosopher put an end to conversation? The answer is to be found in Gaita’s own philosophical practice: the right tone is always approached through continuous repetition, it is never finally attained.
^37	 . Cf. Gadamer’s remarks on conversation in Truth and Method (1989, 301-2).
^38	 . See Gaita’s response (2011) to many of those who have continued the conversation with him (like Hauerwas 2011, Mulhall 2011, Wynn 2005, 2009).
^39	 . Nussbaum’s frequent analogy from the literary reader to the moral subject also underlines this (1992, 142-3, for example). Thus the key question explicitly becomes for Nussbaum: “What sort of activity on the reader’s part will best fulfil the aims of the Socratic assessment process [of moral claims]?” (143)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